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Open Peer Commentaries
Libet and Freedom in a Mind-Haunted
World
David Gordon Limbaugh , University at Buffalo
Robert Kelly , University at Buffalo
Saigle, Dubljevic, and Racine (2018) claim that Libet-style
experiments are insufficient to challenge that agents have
free will. They support this with evidence from experimen-
tal psychology that the folk concept of freedom is consis-
tent with monism, that our minds are identical to our
brains. However, recent literature suggests that evidence
from experimental psychology is less than determinate in
this regard, and that folk intuitions are too unrefined as to
provide guidance on metaphysical issues like monism. In
light of this, it is worthwhile to examine the authors’ insuf-
ficiency claim under the assumption that monism is false
and dualism true (our minds are not identical to our
brains). We conclude that, were dualism true, then Libet-
style experiments would tell us no more about freedom
and moral responsibility than what the authors initially
claimed, thus further bolstering their point that Libet-style
experiments are ill-suited to speak to the free will of
agents.
In what follows we first discuss some of the reasons to
be skeptical of using folk intuitions to make claims about
the nature of freedom and moral responsibility. We then
draw from the work of E. J. Lowe to demonstrate that
Libet-style experiments would likely give the same results
regardless of the truth of monism or dualism.
THE EVIDENCE
There are many reasons to be skeptical that the data of
experimental psychology settle that the folk conception of
freedom is consistent with monism. Here we briefly dis-
cuss three.
First, one might be unmoved by the appeal to folk
intuitions in general, arguing that the threat posed by
Libet-style experiments concerns free will itself, and not
what the folk believe about free will. One should hardly
be moved by folk intuitions about, for instance, the
relationship between gravity and acceleration in general
relativity or fat intake and cardiovascular health. The
folk lack the proper training to appreciate the relevant
data in such technical fields as physics and biology.
Why not think the same is true about the relationship
between freedom and monism, which similarly involves
highly complex and technical metaphysical concepts?1
This line of thought is controversial but needs a
response if one is going to rely on experimental data
about folk judgments.2
Second, even granting the importance of investigating
folk judgments, it is unclear what the judgments garnered
in these studies actually show. Some (e.g., Feltz and Millan
2015) think that they merely express “free will no matter
what” intuitions. Moreover, it’s often hard to interpret
whether folk judgments are tracking freedom, agency,
autonomy, choice, attribution of responsibility or punish-
ment, or some other related concept. This is also in line
with Clark and colleagues’ (2014) work hypothesizing that
the folk belief in freedom is more concerned with justifying
punishment than tracking free actions.
Third, Saigle and colleagues fail to sufficiently explore
the role of the mental apart from the brain in folk concep-
tions of freedom. The authors contend that the work they
appeal to shows that the folk conception of freedom is
monistic, and so evidence of antecedent, highly predictive
brain activity would not undermine freedom in the folk’s
sense. However, perhaps the most influential work on folk
freedom challenges this. The bypassing theory of Nahmias
and colleagues (see Nahmias, Coates, and Kvaran 2007;
Murray and Nahmias 2014) shows that people are much
less likely to ascribe freedom to an agent when the case is
1. This objection is a form of the expertise defense, which is a popular—though at times overstated—response to the experimental philos-
ophy movement (e.g., see Williamson 2007).
2. Indeed, the proper response to the expertise defense was to provide arguments for why it was unsuccessful (e.g., see Weinberg et al.
2010).
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described in terms of neurochemistry as opposed to psy-
chological states (Nahmias, Coates, and Kvaran 2007). In
light of this, it is worth considering whether people are
actually monists, seeing as they find a relevant distinction
between the brain and mind in regard to freedom.
Without proper solutions to such difficulties, the
authors should resist replying to the worry about the Libet
studies by simply appealing to the idea that the folk con-
ception of freedom is clearly consistent with deterministic
monism.
THE EMPIRICAL POSSIBILITY OF AMIND-HAUNTED
WORLD
Here we examine whether Libet-style experiments can
speak to the efficacy of the mind in causing our actions
were dualism true. The threat of Libet-style experiments is
that they purportedly show the inefficacy of the mind and,
a fortiori, our decisions, were the mind not identical to the
brain. It has been argued that were our decisions to play
no role in causing our actions (i.e., were they epiphenome-
nal), then not only would those actions not be free but we
would be systematically deceived about the relationship
between our decisions and our actions in the physical
world (Lowe 2008). The loss of blaming practices alone
would demand severe revision to our beliefs (e.g., beliefs
about blame, praise, punishment, and reward), but a loss
of confidence that we are rational agents would undermine
the scientific enterprise altogether. Monism provides an
easy solution: If my mind is identical to my brain, then
some of the neural states that sufficiently cause my actions
are my decisions. However, there are compelling reasons
to believe that monism is false, and the philosophical liter-
ature and evidence from folk intuitions both suggest that
monism lacks consensus as the true theory of mind, mean-
ing dualism cannot simply be dismissed in these discus-
sions. Thus, it is worth asking, “Were dualism true, would
Libet-style experiments be a potential threat to freedom
and rationality?”
Our answer to the preceding question is “No.” How-
ever, before we discuss the shortcomings of Libet-style
experiments, let us first get clear on the nature of the prob-
lem they are supposed to create. A common argument
against dualism is that were we free and the world
haunted by minds that are not identical to brains, then we
should expect to see events (including actions) that are
empirically inexplicable; according to our best science, all
events appear empirically explicable; thus, if there are
minds, then they must be identical to our brains. This
line of inference assumes two things: (1) There is no sys-
tematic overdetermination, such that some event type
has more than one sufficient cause (call this “no-over-
determination”), and (2) at every time at which any physi-
cal event has a cause, it has a sufficient physical cause (call
this “physical causal closure”).3
Here is the argument restated with these assumptions
made explicit:
1. If dualism is true and minds causally contribute to free
actions, then either physical causal closure is false or
no-overdetermination is false.
2. Physical causal closure is true.
3. No-overdetermination is true.
4. Therefore, it is not the case that dualism is true and
minds causally contribute to free actions.4
The upshot of the argument, were it sound, is that
our physical actions must be the result of an unbroken
chain of physical events, which, if dualism is true,
would entail epiphenomenalism and the denial of free-
dom. Libet-style experiments contribute to the dialectic
by providing support for premise 2. Let us now turn to
why it is that the support offered by Libet-style experi-
ments is insignificant.
What is at issue is whether or not we should expect the
truth of dualism to make a difference in the results of
Libet-style experiments; there is little reason to expect that
it would. At best, the experiments merely show that neural
states are reliable predictors of physical actions. However,
this hardly rules out the presence of a causally significant
nonphysical mind. Imagine that we were able to exhaus-
tively examine a causal chain, using empirical methods, as
it unfolded from neural events to bodily actions; we
should expect each member of the chain studied by this
method to be a physical event. This is because empirical
methods can do none other than study physical phenom-
ena. To expect them to do more would be like expecting a
phonograph to produce color rather than sound. Thus, if
there are nonphysical mental events involved, they would
go unnoticed, by design.
As a result, a monist world and dualist world can be
empirically indistinguishable. Consider the monist and
dualist causal chains represented in Figure 1.
Given that nonphysical mental events (m) are unde-
tectable by empirical methods, the dualistic chain would
appear empirically to contain only four physical events (p)
occurring at odd times (t), which is what we would expect
from the monistic chain as well. As such, the chains are
empirically indistinguishable and would yield identical
results according to Libet-style experiments. If we should
expect the same results regardless of whether we are in a
monist or dualist world, then Libet-style experiments are
ill-suited to speak to the truth of either thesis.
One might object that because the dualist model postu-
lates more entities, the monist model should be preferred,
all things being equal (the saw of Ockham’s razor). But
according to the dualist, all things are not equal. As Lowe
points out, “In the mind-body case we start out with an ini-
tial intuition that mental events really do occur and are
completely different from physical events” (2008, 77).
3. This is the formulation used by Lowe (2008, 48). 4. For more on this brand of argument see Kim (2000).
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Thus, as long as dualism is consistent with empirical find-
ings, “it is perfectly reasonable to suppose that interactive
dualism may well in fact be true” (Lowe 2008, 77). Also,
for what it is worth, the dualist model is more capable of
explaining the presence of Benjamin Libet’s “veto con-
trol.”5 We conclude that not only are Libet-style experi-
ments no threat to freedom given monism, but they are
also no threat were dualism true.&
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Figure 1. Monist versus Dualist Causal Chains.
5. Libet thought his results were consistent with an agent retaining
the ability to “veto” her intention before it is executed. This has
sometimes been called “free won’t.” See Libet (1985, 538) for
discussion.
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